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New Challenges for the European Court of
Human Rights Resulting from the
Expanding Case Load and Membership
Paul Mahoney*
I.

The Problem and its Genesis

The present single, permanent European Court of Human Rights,
with one judge for each of the now 43 Contracting States (Armenia being
the most recent State as of April 26, 2002), was set up in Strasbourg,
France 1 in November 1998 when, by virtue of Protocol No. 11 to the
European Convention on Human Rights, it replaced the two former parttime enforcement bodies, the European Commission and European Court
of Human Rights. The reform introduced by Protocol No. 11 was
"principally aimed at restructuring the system so as to shorten the length
of Strasbourg proceedings." 2 Its purpose was to provide "a supervising
machinery that can work efficiently and at acceptable costs even with
forty member States and which can maintain the authority and quality of
3

the case-law in the future.",
A quick look at the statistics shows that, after three and a half years
of existence of the new Court, the aim defined by the drafters of Protocol
No. 11 is not being achieved. Upon its inception, the Court inherited
some 6,800 pending registered applications from the Commission, and
90 or so cases from the old Court. Three years later, at the beginning of
2002, 19,815 registered applications were pending: the inheritance had
almost trebled. In 1998, 5,981 applications were registered, followed by
8,400 in 1999, 10,482 in 2000 and 13,858 in 2001-that is, annual

* Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights. Any views expressed are
personal. A version of this paper was presented at the International Law Conference
entitled Human Rights: Dynamic Dimensions, held in London on April 27, 2002, and
sponsored by the Center for International and Comparative Law of The Dickinson School
of Law of The Pennsylvania State University in collaboration with the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London.
1. The seat of the Court and its parent Organisation, the Council of Europe.
2. Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11,
10-18 (1994).
3. Id.
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increases of 40.44 %, 24.78 %, and 32.20 % over the last three years.
The upward trend in incoming applications continues in 2002. It
concerns both the long-established Convention countries and the socalled new democracies from the former Soviet bloc. While productivity
is constantly improving in the face of this exponential increase,4 the
Court is unable to dispose of, each month, the same number of
applications as are being received. 5 As a result of this imbalance
between intake and output, the total number of pending cases is
inexorably increasing and, correspondingly, the prospect of the Court
"catching up" with its arrears of work is becoming fainter and fainter.
There is doubtless room, within the existing procedural framework
laid down by the Convention, to expand the Court's annual caseprocessing capacity beyond the results achieved in 2001 (just under
10,000 cases disposed of6).
Such a result can be achieved by
streamlining procedures even further, especially in unmeritorious and
routine cases, and by increasing the Court's resources, in particular the
number of Registry lawyers preparing the cases for disposition by the

judges.7 The system for registering applications and the procedure for
rejecting obviously inadmissible cases in Committees of three judges
have been radically simplified as from January of this year. 8 A
4. An average of 823 cases were disposed of per month in 2001 as compared with
622 in 2000 and 308 in 1999.
5. The monthly average for 2001 was 1,155 applications registered as against 823
applications decided; in 2000 it was 883 applications registered as against 622
applications decided.
6. That is, 8,959 applications declared inadmissible or struck off the list (8,314 by
Committees, 675 by Chambers) and 888 judgments.
7. For an instructive comparison of how (similarly, in many ways) the European
Court of Human Rights and the United States Courts of Appeals are endeavouring,
through case-management techniques, to absorb growing case-loads, see Dinah Shelton,
Ensuring Justice with Deliberate Speed: Case-Management in the European Court of
Human Rights and the United States Courts of Appeals, 21 HuM. RTS. L.J. 337 (2000).
See also Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeal, submitted to the President of the Congress of the United States
pursuant to Public Law Nos. 105-119 (December 18, 1998); this Commission had been
set up by Congress in late 1997, "in the wake of controversy over whether the court of
appeals for the Ninth Circuit-the largest federal court of appeals-ha[d] grown to a
point that it [could] not function effectively and whether, in response, Congress should
split the Ninth Circuit to create two or more smaller courts." Id. See also the Report of
April 2, 1990, by the Federal Courts Standing Committee of the United States, appointed
by the Chief Justice at the direction of Congress in response to "mounting public and
professional concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense and expansion."
8. In particular, a separate paper decision for each application rejected by a
Committee is no longer produced. Committees now deal with batches of applications a
time. Minutes of the meeting, signed by the President of the Committee and the
responsible Registrar, record what applications were rejected and what applications, if
any, were referred to a Chamber of seven judges. Applicants receive a letter in their own
language informing them that the application has been declared inadmissible or struck out
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budgetary package involving injection of further resources over the next
three years has been submitted to the Governments. As a result, the
prospects of raising productivity nearer to the level of the incoming
business are looking better. A Court of forty or so judges, with adequate
resources, could process 14,000 cases annually (this being approximately
the number of applications registered last year) without any need to
reform Protocol No. 11; perhaps 20,000, or 30,000, or even 50,000. But
there must, at some point, be a threshold beyond which the Court
collectively and the individual judges cannot go.
If the upward
progression of cases being lodged in Strasbourg continues, one does not
need to be a soothsayer to predict that, even if the statistical curve of
annual increases becomes less steep, and whatever "managerial" changes
are made within the existing structures regarding working methods,
internal organization, and the procedural treatment of cases, the
enforcement machinery set up by Protocol No. 11 will ultimately prove
to be incapable of fulfilling the purpose fixed for it by its creators.
Furthermore, "constant seeking for greater 'productivity' obviously
entails the risk that [meritorious] applications will not receive
sufficient..,
consideration to the detriment of the quality of
judgments." 9
It would, therefore, be unwise to rule out that further reform-in the
sense of structural changes that redesign the architecture of adjudication
by the Court-will be called for, in addition to "managerial" changes, if
the Court is not to be overwhelmed by its already enormous and growing
case-load.'0
II.

The Mission of the European Court of Human Rights

What must be done, in terms of structural reform, to ensure the
continued effectiveness of the Court? This question was referred, by the
Council of Europe, in February 2001, for study to an "Evaluation Group"
composed of the Irish Ambassador to the Council (Justin Harman), the
President of the Court (Luzius Wildhaber), and the Deputy Secretary
General of the Council of Europe and former Secretary to the European
Commission of Human Rights for 20 years (Hans-Christian KrUger).
The answer to the this question depends on the answer to another, far
more basic question: why have a European Court of Human Rights in
and specifying, with reference to the relevant provision of the Convention, on what
formal ground the application has been rejected, but without making explicit the
particular reasons for the rejection.
9. Report of the Evaluation Group to the Committee of Ministers on the European
Court of Human Rights § 39, EG Court (2001)1 Council of Europe (Sept. 27, 2001).
10. The vocabulary of "managerial" and "structural" changes is borrowed from the
1990 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, supra note 7.
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addition to the national mechanisms for securing human rights? In other
words, the basic objective pursued by the Convention system should
shape the contours of any possible reform.
Study of the drafting history of the Convention, and of the practice
of the Strasbourg enforcement bodies, brings to light a tension between
two visions of the purpose of the European Convention on Human
Rights, with its right of individual petition. One perspective, that of
"individual justice," views as the soul of the Convention the entitlement
of each and every complainant to examination of his or her complaint
and, if it is upheld, to individualized relief. The other, that of
"constitutional justice," regards the Convention as a constitutional
instrument of European public order in the field of human rights, and
thus the mechanism of individual applications as the means by which
defects in national protection of human rights are detected with a view to
correcting them; thereby raising the general standard of protection of
human rights, both in the country concerned and in the Convention
community of States as a whole.
The emphasis has shifted at differing points during the
Convention's history, but the demands imposed on the system by the
vision of full "individual justice" have become increasingly difficult to
meet as the caseload grows to enormous proportions.
Furthermore, the community of States served by the Convention has
changed considerably in make-up since 1989 (following the fall of the
Berlin Wall), in that it has expanded to include components of the former
Soviet bloc nations, some with relatively recent and fragile democratic
bases.' The Court, like its parent Organization, the Council of Europe,
has acquired a new mission. Until 1989, the Convention could be
described as an international control mechanism for fine-tuning
sophisticated national democratic engines that were, on the whole,
working well. Now, and in the foreseeable future, this is not a blanket
assumption that can be made for many of the participating States that are
starting out on the democratic path. The nature, not only the volume, of
the cases submitted is liable to change. 12
As far as the older participating States are concerned, the
environment within which the Court operates has also changed. The
11. For a perceptive assessment of the impact of the enlargement of the Council of
Europe on the role of the Court, see Robert Harmsen, The European Convention on
Human Rights after Enlargement, INT'L J. HUM. RTS., vol. 5, at 18 (2001).
12. It is also interesting to note how, statistically, the new democracies from the
former Soviet bloc are increasingly entering into the Convention system. In 1999 the
percentage of registered applications from the new democracies was 39 %; by 2001 the
figure had risen to 56 %. The volume of applications from the original States is not
diminishing, however - it is merely that the rates of increase are not as high as those of
the new States.
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Convention and its accumulated case-law have penetrated the fabric of
domestic law and are being applied on a daily basis by national judges,
whereas in earlier times the national legal systems did not on the whole
take express account of the Convention standards. For such countries the
Strasbourg Court is far less frequently called upon to review facts for the
first time in terms of the Convention standards. The subsidiary character
of the Convention is being reinforced progressively and consolidated by
the national authorities themselves-not only the courts but also the
legislature and the executive-thereby repatriating to the domestic legal
system much of the human rights review function hitherto performed in
Strasbourg. "Bringing rights home" as a description of the British
Human Rights Act of 1998 is not a misnomer.
What should one now expect of the European Court of Human
Rights in this changed environment? To quote the preface to the Report
of the Evaluation Group' 3:
Since 1989-1990 the enlargement of the Council of Europe has
created a new dimension for the operation of the Convention system.
While the underlying purpose of the system remained the same, the
Court now had a further role to play in the consolidation of
democracy and the rule of law in the wider Europe. This is a process
which continues today. In this sense its significance has arguably
never been greater. The Court, through its case-law and in
partnership with national Supreme and Constitutional Courts, serves
to infuse national legal systems with the democratic values and the
legal principles of the Convention and helps to ensure that
Convention standards are implemented in everyday practice.
The major challenge for the Court today is not only to maintain and
develop the Convention standards but also to ensure that the Europe
of human rights remains a single entity with common values.
On that analysis, the Convention and its complaint-based
enforcement machinery should not be viewed as aiming at providing
individual relief for as many European citizens as possible, but, rather, as
having the more general purposes of ensuring that each Convention
country puts in place within its own internal legal order effective means
for securing the guaranteed rights (the subsidiary facet); avoiding
repetition of circumstances giving rise to a violation of the guaranteed
rights (the preventive facet); and welding together a human rights
community of nations with shared legal values across the whole mosaic
of post-1989 Europe (the unifying facet). Those purposes are achieved
by elucidating through individual cases the Convention principles to be
13.

See Evaluation Group Report, supra note 9, p. 8.
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applied by national authorities.
III. The Possible Solutions to the Problem
If one accepts that this is the reason why there should be a European
Court of Human Rights in the twenty-first century, what then are the
means that the Governments should be looking at in order to ensure the
Court's continued effectiveness?
A.

PossibleSolutions that are not Wholly Convincing

The potential for the flow of alleged violations of the Convention to
Strasbourg is enormous. There are over 800 million European citizens
living in over forty different countries. The Convention and its
guarantees percolate into every aspect of life in the participating
countries-social, political, and even economic. There are a myriad of
instances in people's lives where some measure or act or omission by the
public authorities, including the legislature, is capable of having an
adverse impact on the enjoyment of one of the rights or freedoms
guaranteed to them under the Convention. A full-blown mini legal
system centered on Strasbourg would be needed if the principle of
affording proper judicial examination and individual relief at an
international level in each case of alleged unjustified interference with a
Convention right were to prevail.
Apart from the maximalist solution of a mini legal system, a number
of other possible solutions can also be discounted at this early stage.
For example, doubling the number of judges to over eighty would
undoubtedly expand the judicial case-processing capacity and address the
problem of volume, but it would create an unwieldy body not capable of
giving the focused "authority and quality of the case-law" that the
drafters of Protocol No 11 intended. Genuine collegiality capable of
producing a consistent, coherent case law would be impossible in a Court
comprising 90 judges.
Similarly, the idea of regionalizing the Convention machinery,1 4 by
14. An idea originally advanced by Robert Badinter, former President of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS - ORGANISATION
AND PROCEDURE - QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOCOL No. 11 TO
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 158 (1997) [proceedings of the Colloquy

organised by the Human Rights Centre of the University of Potsdam in co-operation with
the Council of Europe]; and Du ProtocoleNo. 11 au Protocole N' 12, in MLANGES EN
Badinter's point of departure for
HOMMAGE A LOUIS-EDMOND PETTITI 103 (1998).
regionalization is that within the large community of States that now subscribe to the
Convention the level of human rights protection actually assured and capable of being
assured by the domestic legal orders varies enormously: at one end of the scale some of
the countries from the former Soviet bloc who still have a young and somewhat
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splitting it into decentralized, regional tribunals and a supreme instance
sitting in Strasbourg, has found few supporters. 15 The major argument
made against regionalization is that it would create a "two-speed" system
of human rights protection in Europe, that runs counter to the current
mission of the Council of Europe-not just in the human rights domain
but throughout the entirety of the Council's
activities-namely to bring
16
the whole of Europe under one roof.

Also finding little favor are "[the] suggestions that the Court should
be empowered to give preliminary rulings on Convention issues at the
request of national courts (in a procedure akin to that utilized by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities) or that its competence to
give advisory opinions (Articles 47-49 of the Convention) should be
expanded."17 Unless the right of individual petition were to be limited or
suppressed in parallel, any reform along such lines would be unlikely to
resolve the caseload problem; on the contrary, it would merely serve to
burden the Court with extra duties.
What is needed to maintain the effectiveness of the Court are means
that are "practical and workable," to use the words of one of the drafters
of the Convention in 1949, as well as reconcilable with the imperatives
of principle. As the Evaluation Group put it in its report:
There is ... a need, in addition to the procedural streamlining and
resource increases [required in the immediate under the present
framework of the Convention], for yet further measures to reduce the
workload, to expedite the handling of applications that do not warrant
rudimentary democratic base and at the other end the older, established democracies with
highly sophisticated mechanisms protecting civil liberties. The human rights realities are
wildly different and the enforcement machinery should be adapted to this, Badinter is in
effect saying.
15. Cf the similar recommendation made by the United States Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 7, at x of the
foreword, and Summary: "[W]e recommend that Congress enact a statute organizing the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals into three regionally based adjudicative divisions - the
Northern, Middle, and Southern - each division with a majority of its judges resident in
its region, and each having exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the judicial districts
within its region... Each division would function as a semi-autonomous decisional unit.
To resolve conflicts that might develop between regional divisions, we recommend a
Circuit Division for conflict correction... With from seven to eleven judges serving
together on each regional division over an extended period of time, this plan would
increase the consistency and coherence of the law, maximize the likelihood of genuine
collegiality, establish an effective procedure for maintaining uniform decisional law
within the circuit, and relate the appellate forum more closely to the region it serves. The
circuit would remain intact as an administrative unit, functioning as it now does."
16. See Evaluation Group Report, supra note 9, § 83: "[T]he Evaluation Group [was]
not attracted by this solution: it carries a risk of diverging standards and case-law,
whereas the essence of the Convention system is that uniform standards, collectively set
and enforced, should obtain throughout the Contracting States."
17. See id., § 84.
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detailed treatment and to leave the judges with sufficient time to
devote to those that do. 18
B.

Lighter, More EconomicalInitial Screeningof Applications
Received

Such a conclusion argues in favor of a restructuring of the
enforcement machinery, returning to a division of responsibility as
regards admissibility and merits, whether within the framework of a
single Court, or by means of separate. institutions, as under the original
1950 model. In any event, an economical, timesaving system must be
devised for filtering the huge mass of applications that are lodged. In
time, forty or so judges will hardly have the time for this preliminary
work as well as that of giving full, deliberative attention to meritorious
applications. One can also doubt the wisdom of requiring such highly
qualified judges to spend so much time on what is a relatively low-level
judicial exercise that does not require great expertise.
Under this approach, the basic principle of the right of individual
petition-keeping the doors of the Strasbourg Court open to all
supplicants-would be maintained, but there would be no guarantee of
the same kind of treatment being accorded to all applicants once inside
the doors. 19 A much lighter, more expeditious treatment for the
thousands of unmeritorious applications received every year must be
instituted if the foreseeable increase in the number of applications is to
be absorbed in an economical manner, both judicially and financially.
This is not to say that the initial screening should not be carried out
by a judge, in the sense of someone having judicial status, with all the
usual guarantees of independence and impartiality.
It is perfectly
conceivable to have within one legal system two categories of persons0
2
exercising judicial power: lower-instance judges or "judicial officers"
who perform designated accessory functions such as identifying and
-preparing for disposition cases suitable for adjudication by higher18.
19.

Seeid., §§81and90.
See id., § 92, for the similar conclusion of the Evaluation Group: "[T]he point

has been reached at which a difficult choice has to be made: either the Court continues to
attempt to deal in the same way with all the applications that arrive (in which event it will
slowly sink), or it reserves detailed treatment for those cases which, in the light of its
overall object and purpose (see the Preface to this report), warrant such attention. Not
without some soul-searching but nevertheless unreservedly, the Group opts for the second
alternative."
20. Adapting the language of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which guarantees
prompt judicial control of deprivation of liberty on suspicion of commission of a criminal
offence: 'Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1
(c) of this Article shall be brought before a judge or other officer authorisedby law to
exercisejudicialpower..." [Emphasis added.]
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instance judges-on the model, for example, of examining magistrates
who send a case for trial before judges.
Such a redistribution of tasks within the Convention enforcement
machinery would not necessarily entail a reversion to something like the
original Commission/Court structure established under the 1950 version
of the Convention. Under that structure there was a duplication of
functions, in that the Commission acted more like a court of first instance
in also addressing the merits in admissible cases. What the pre-1998
architecture of the enforcement machinery did show is that having one
corps of adjudicators for initial screening, 2 1and another corps for dealing
with complaints identified as meritorious, is both compatible as a matter
of principle with the ethos of the Convention and workable in practice.
If the option of reducing the workload of the Court to manageable
proportions by instituting a tribunal of first instance with jurisdiction to
rule on the merits is to be discounted (as it is likely to be by the
Governments, if only for financial reasons), an alternative is to limit the
power of the first level of judicial officers to what the Evaluation Group
called "streaming,' 22 that is, an initial screening that places different
categories of applications on appropriate procedural tracks. The power
of the filtering "judicial officers" could include the rejection by final
decision obviously inadmissible applications; referring on up the line to
the elected judges on the Court applications where admissibility is
arguable; and certifying as admissible and, where appropriate, manifestly
well founded other applications.
In favoring a scheme along these lines, the Evaluation Group
proposed the creation of a separate division within the Court. As the
Evaluation Group saw it, "the Court would consist of two divisions, the
first composed of elected judges and the second-with responsibility for
preliminary examination of applications-composed of appropriately
appointed independent and impartial persons invested with judicial status
23
(who would be designated as 'assessors' or some other suitable title)."
Of course, other models are conceivable. In any event, whatever
views one might have on the various conceivable models, what is clear is
that some more procedurally economical form of judicial screening is
necessary to prevent asphyxiation of the Court.

21. Screening that, under the 1950 version of the Convention, it should be noted,
included giving the decision on the admissibility of all applications.
22. In a different context, admittedly; see Evaluation Group Report, supra note 9, §§

58-61.
23. See id., §§ 98 and 100.21.
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A Method to Control the Flow of Cases Destinedfor FullJudicial
Examination.

Even if the ever-mounting mass of applications lodged each year
were to go through some process of preliminary sifting, so as to relieve
the Court (that is the elected judges) of this time-consuming but
unrewarding burden, it would also be advisable to incorporate into the
procedure a method to allow the Court itself to control the flow of cases
that it receives.
As long as the principle of free access to Strasbourg is maintained,
as it must be, the volume of judicial business will be irreducible. The
number of incoming applications is increasing every year. A mechanism
for a preliminary examination of applications, as the Evaluation Group
called it, will provide a means for absorbing, more economically in
procedural terms, such increases in volume at the admissibility stage. It
will not, however, wholly protect the Court with respect to the
accomplishment of its main task, namely that of adjudicating meritorious
cases, with a view to the setting of standards for what is now a panEuropean community of States. Again, as the Evaluation Group put it,
"a vital consideration must be to ensure that judges are left with
sufficient time to devote to what have been called 'constitutional
judgments', i.e. fully reasoned and authoritative judgments in cases
which raise substantial or new and complex issues of human rights law,
are of particular significance for the State concerned or involve
allegations of serious human rights 24violations and which warrant a full
process of considered adjudication.
In this context, the previously quoted statistics on obviously
unmeritorious and inadmissible applications only provide part of the
picture regarding the slow suffocation of the Strasbourg Court. There is,
at the other end of the spectrum, another category of applications
responsible for clogging the Court's docket: manifestly well-founded
but repetitive cases that involve routine application of well established
case-law, where it is quite clear from the outset that a violation has
occurred. Prime examples of this category are cases in which the only or
principal allegation is one of unreasonable length of proceedings in civil
or criminal matters, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention. Between
1955 and 1999, 3,129 of the total of 5,307 applications declared
admissible (58.95 %) raised a complaint of length of proceedings. In
2000, a total of 695 judgments were delivered by the Court. Impressive,
one might think, until it is realized that 485 of them (69.78 %) were
straightforward cases exclusively or principally concerning alleged
24.

Id., § 98.
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excessive length of proceedings, and 81 (11.65 %) were judgments
essentially applying standard case-law. Fewer than 20 %25of the cases
actually raised a new or serious issue under the Convention.
What is the justification for the highest "constitutional" Court in
Europe spending so much of its time and resources on dealing with, for
example, the thousands of cases from Italy, where the sole subject matter
is unexceptional civil litigation that has lasted too long. Particularly in
light of the fact that the Court has already delivered a leading declaratory
judgment of principle 26 to the effect that the system of civil justice in
Italy, as presently organized, is incapable of ensuring observance of the
reasonable-time requirement in Article 6 of the Convention. Behind
each one of these thousands of applications there is, of course, an
individual who has suffered an unjustified denial of his or her
Convention right to trial within a reasonable time. But is it the purpose
of the Strasbourg Court to give considered adjudication and relief on
each and every one of these cases? The consequence is that treatment of
cases that raise genuine human rights issues is delayed.27
Whilst all applicants in these follow-up cases may well be the
victims of a violation, the Italian example shows that what is being
brought before the Court in each of these successive applications is in
reality a problem of execution of the earlier judgment of principle, rather
than an adjudicative issue warranting the attention of the Court. In terms
of the objective pursued by the Convention's enforcement system, the
role of the Court has effectively been exhausted once a defect in the
national legal order has been identified through an individual application.
Thereafter, it should be for the respondent Government (by virtue of the
principle of subsidiarity), and the other States on the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe (in their capacity as guarantors of the
proper execution of judgments), to assume responsibility for all the
various implications of the judgment of principle-notably, ensuring that
the spotlighted defect is remedied (general measures) and recognizing
and compensating all other victims (individual measures). Here, then, is

25. On a cursory analysis, the figures for 2001 are comparable: 888 judgments
delivered, 480 (54 %) standard length proceedings, approximately 275 (31 %) application
of established case-law, with the remainder, approximately 15 %, new or serious issues.
26. Botazzi v. Italy, ECHR 1999-V 17.
27. See Harmsen, supra note 11. Mr. Harmsen makes, broadly, the same point when
talking of the enlargement of the Council of Europe bringing with it "increased pressures
on the Court to recast itself as more of a constitutional court": "[T]he Court should
concern itself more with questions of general jurisprudential doctrine, seeking on the
basis of individual cases to establish clear interpretative principles of more general
applicability. Already prior to enlargement,.. . many felt that the Strasbourg system was
becoming bogged down by the need to process a large number of comparatively minor
complaints which raised no new points of law."
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an indication of one aspect of a possible structural reform of the
Convention remedy: to shift what is really a judgment-execution
responsibility towards more appropriate shoulders.
The manifestly well-founded phenomenon in "minor" and repetitive
cases is one of the main factors that has provoked a call for the
introduction of a leave-to-appeal clause. The Evaluation Group made a
proposal for the insertion into the Convention of a new provision "that
would in essence empower the Court to decline to examine in detail
28
applications which raise no substantial issue under the Convention.,
The question, of course, arises as to what is to happen to such
applications if the Strasbourg Court declines to examine them. Via one
perspective, the brutal answer is: nothing. The Strasbourg Court cannot
be expected to deal with the details of every human rights ill that occurs
in a Convention community of 800 million people. If the judgment of
the Strasbourg Court is that the application does not raise a substantial
issue under the Convention, then there is no justification in pursuing the
matter on the international level. The Evaluation Group, however, took a
more clement approach. It said: "Nevertheless, a blind eye cannot be
turned to the question of what happens to the author of an application
that is not accepted for detailed treatment. The Evaluation Group
considers that this point should be studied concurrently with the drafting
of the new provision, with a view to devising a mechanism whereby
States would agree that such an application be remitted back to their
authorities for reconsideration...
Alternatively, or additionally, where it has been established in a
judgment of principle that there exists a structural or organizational
shortcoming in the national legal order or an administrative practice,
rather than simply a series of similar incidents, subsequent applications
raising the same issue could well be treated as part of the process of
execution of the judgment of principle. Such matters could be referred,
without further examination by the Court, to the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe, the body responsible for supervising the
execution of judgments. As a component of any reform, therefore, a
special procedure of execution, to be activated by the Court by means of
a direction in the operative provisions of the judgment of principle, could
be devised to take account of this category of application.
Predictably, the proposal to invest the Court with a power of
selection over what cases it will look into has provoked concern, even
protest, from many quarters, notably the non-governmental organizations
in the human rights field, .onthe basis that it involves cutting down the
28.
29.

See Evaluation Group Report, supra note 9, §§ 93 and 100.20 (a).
See id., § 96.
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30
hard-won right of individual petition for reasons of pure expediency.
One can understand, and sympathize with, such a reaction, but it is
difficult to see many other viable alternatives if one wants to keep a
Europe-wide Court of Human Rights capable of providing a focused,
consistent, and coherent case-law and of adjudicating meritorious cases
with proper attention and within a reasonable time.

IV. Conclusion
Acting on the report of the Evaluation Group, the Council of Europe
has referred the issue of possible reform of the Convention to a
governmental steering committee on human rights. This committee is
undertaking a widespread consultation of interested parties, including
non-governmental organizations. Its final recommendations are expected
in July 2003.
This paper's underlying conclusion is that there are two primary
measures, the implementation of which is necessary to secure the
continued effectiveness of the Strasbourg Court.
First, in the medium rather than the long term, an overhaul of the
enforcement machinery under the European Convention on Human
Rights, instituting (1) a lighter, more expeditious mechanism for
preliminary judicial screening of applications, to be carried out by a
corps of junior judges called judicial officers, assessors, adjudicators,
magistrates or something of the like; and (2) the Court itself being
enabled to control its "jurisprudential" workload by being vested with the
power to accept for full judicial consideration only those cases which
raise what the judges consider a substantial issue under the Convention.
Second, and in the meantime, a significant increase in the Court's
resources and procedural innovations designed to reduce, to the
minimum that is possible within the existing framework, the time spent
by judges and the Registry on obviously inadmissible applications and on
wholly routine and repetitive admissible applications (for example,
through according priority to certain categories of applications to the
detriment of others).
It is fair to say that many Convention commentators and insiders
fear that the kind of reform advocated in this paper would entail a
dilution, for almost exclusively financial reasons, of what they consider
to be the judicial character of the right of individual petition. They feel
very strongly that the right of every individual to have his or her
30. For a balanced expression of such concern and an assessment of the Evaluation
Group's Report, see John Wadham and Tazeen Said, What Price the Right of Individual
Petition:Report of the Evaluation Group to the Committee of Ministers on the European
Court of Human Rights, E.C.H.R.L.R., Issue 2, at 169-174 (2002).
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complaint scrutinized by the judge elected by the Parliamentary
Assembly, if only to declare it inadmissible, is the strength and
identifying characteristic of the Convention system, an acquis that should
be maintained. Where the foregoing analysis, following more or less the
same approach as that of the Evaluation Group, parts company with that
view is not so much in the choice of the cures for an agreed ill, but,
rather, at the beginning of the story: it sees a far more general and less
individualistic rationale for the existence of the European Court on
Human Rights and, thus, different tools for maintaining the Court's
effectiveness.

